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The year 1917 is probably the most significant year in 
modern Russian history . Many people view this as the year 
of the Bolsheviks . Indeed , Lenin and his cohorts seized the 
r eigns of government i n November (all dates will be given in 
New Style) of that year and pr opelled Russia down an untrodden 
path of history . The effects of this revolutio~ now perme~te the 
globe . Some view that fateful day as the begihning of man ' s 
salvation from the exploitation of capitalism. Others view 
it as the birth of a pernicious disease which must be eliminated 
in a final apocal ypti c battle to save mankind . However , far too 
few people study the actual events of 1917 . Whi le scholarly 
work on the per iod is voluminous , many of the wor ks are skewed 
by the ideological perspective of the authors . Few people , . 
aside from historians , are cognizant of the historical actions 
which finally resul ted in the triumph of Bolshvism. 
This paper wiil discuss the events leading to November 7, 
1917. However , I will not focus on the activities of the 
Bolsheviks during the eight months leading to the November 
revol ution . There arc many accounts detailing this amazi ng 
ri se to power . I will , instead , focus on a somewhat neglected 
facet of the Bolshevik revolution : that is the policies of 
the Provisi onal Govern~ent and specifically the policieo of 
Alexander Ker ensky . While much scholarship has been done on 
this period , I wi s h to concentrate on the Provisional Govern-
ment's decision to r ernaln committed to the Allied cause in 
YJorld War I . I parti cu larly wish to demonstrat e that the 
l 
2 
Alli ~s wer e r esPonsible . at l east in Da~t . for: Ker enskv ' s 
decision to r~ma in in tte War and ' that. t~is fn turn . nreci~ 
pitated t he Bolshevik Revolution in November. In d emonstratinR 
this I will implicate· the. Alli es ·as partially ·r esponsibl~ .for 
the Eolshevik ascension to· . oower ~ ,_. · .This implication has ·been .· 
~a i sed 1;;.· few schofars ;Tmos.trhatre<·been~ · insteac:i . •!:.fnte'l7est~d 
in 1. ·demoristratin'g •1tl1e·~·perni~i:ous ::n·a:t.ur.e :.·o·r r-Bo];sh'~v{sm;:.] :: v) ~vi~=-: , 
the · ind ecisive· ·nature' of· Ker·ensky/:or:· the · his:torical neces - · · · 
sity ,6f Bolshevism ~ 
This ~aper· will chronologically ~ etail th e ac tions 'of 
Kerensky and . th ~ Provisiorial : Governcient from its inception in . 
March unt!l its d em is e . in No:vember . . : The f.ocus , as stated·: 
ea~lier, will be . on~he .. decision to :r emain in the _war ~nd . 
the Allies ~ eff eqt in d_et~rminine th.a't- decision. Discussion 
will not be given to the mo_:tives _of .Allied poiicy~'' although it_ 
is obvious . that ·.the All:ies were involved ' in· a :·war ,and · were 
naturally devoting .their energiei ' to the . sucrie~sful .pros~bu­
tion of that war . However ; .more prescient diplom~cy . m<iY: 
have prevented t~ e Bols~evik rise .to':: power. . George J:<ennan , 
an eminent Sovi et special'ist ,, -concludes : that 'The .~ ·Russian ~,'Revo­
lution and the alienation . of the .Russian pEopl e from the · 
Western · community for decad~s to come we~e only a par~ bf 
the staggerinG price paid by .the West <: rr. people for . their 
insistenc e on com~leting a military victory ever Ger many in 
1917 and 1918 . " 1 
Ir. Par l y 1917 , the Russia~ people wer ~ tired of war , 
the suff ~ring CRused by the war and t he fOVernment ' s bungling 
war policies.· As esrly as Sul.y, 1915 the Minist~r ofWar, 
General Polivanov, ;i.s~·quoted aq sayi~g that:_- HFa.it.h7in.,\iltimate 
victory and in their leaders has been,unP,ermineP,.H~ 
A western scholar writing in early 1922 commented that: 
"Not only the army; but the rear guard of every arrtiy, the. 
tiVil,population,· was. sick untp death·and weary of suffering."3 
A Dutch diplomat dispatched to Russia in early/1917 perhaps 
summarized the ·stmosphere best: "The War had not gone well 
for Russia: an atmosphere of depres~ion ·hung over.the country."/.;. 
An American journalist residin·g in Petrograd · <l'ev:eal'~Ld.n:..:his diary 
'that he--concJ.uded- ori J'anuary :31, 1:91'7 ·t'ha:t ;nthere. i"s no .tloubt . 
cth.it •:a· revolution :Es co1ning;'g~~- John ·Gaddfs, a:n -:Arn'e-rican. diplo-
~inatf'c 'hist·orfan, rema'rks in ·ret:rosp~e~o:-tt that <!'three.:·:tyears.:d 
· .. 
!o'f bl'dody ~·and• mismanage{d cotrfl:L:C:.t had so cdemorali:z'ed·_';CRu~ssia) 
;as ·to':'r.erid'~~ (it1S' n~w goVe~~~nt~'·?apa~l'~;_c.o::t>:re·maig·ingtrin ~au.t.hoi·i ty 
only by end~ng act~ ve part~cJ.patJ.on J.n ·the·. war." 
Yet, Kerensky and the members of the Provisional Govern-
ment did not reol:ize tho depth of anti-war sentiment among 
the people. This rising tide of anti-war sentiment finally 
rose and swept Kerensky out of power and replaced him with 
the only leader who promised·pcace~ Lenin. Again, Kennan 
Bsks the reader to note 11 how intimiately the causes of 
Kerensky's failure were connected with his effort to continue 
Russia Is participation in WVII. u7 He concludes that: 11 In 
every respect Kerensky's political position would have been 
eased, ond his prospects for resistance to Bolshevik pressure 
would have been improved, had he been able to take the country 
::~ut cf 
P, 
\V~~r' ;:jt 0:-lC(:." Lc-nnc.\:'l odm.i t::.; that "I <J:n not sure 
\·;~p J {., j_,. !1 cl .... ~;s si.1Jd~,· of the political environment of 
the period and the actions of the AlJ.i~s will illu~lnatc the 
8~swer to this vexipg q~estion. 
to 8bso1utism .. Thc:ee arc m<my intcrprctatic:r:~: of the rcascn::.; 
It· may b·et cbnc1uded; that·~'· ~c 
' 
i~ ~ corepletp dPC8Y of thn c0ntraliz~d source of power. 
h~v~ b~sn thr mi~int~rpretuti~n by l.er~nsky and others ~ithin 
both • 1. + 8 SC;Cl<L.t.lS~ and <J nationali::;t. 
' . ' ,~/. "; -~- c ::: 
1 arn qul t::_: c ~nv inc cd 
that but for the War the Revolution would have come not later 
than the spring of .1915, perhaps even at the end of 19111-." 1° 
In other words, to Kerensky the socialist dial(ctic would 
come to a stop while all Russians defended the Motherland. 
His nationalism skewed his vision and prevented him from 
seeing that the War was augmenting, not weakening, this 
movement towards revolution. 
Kerensky, instead, blamed this growing ievolutionist 
sentiment on dissatisfaction with the inefficienci~s of the 
Tsar's government in pursuing the war, not in the Tsar's basic 
decision to pursue the war. In explaining the causes of the 
if!arch Revolution he states: "The preservation of. absolutism 
and the cause of successful resistance to the enemy stood in 
tragic contradiction to one anothc~.··11 Yet Kerensky's skewed 
vision of the reasons for the revolution c~mpelled him t~attempt to 
eliminate absolutism and to try to pur-sue:~suc.ces$~fu"1U.y -the 
war instead. The result was a complete dissipation of all 
power, allowing extremists complete freedom io agitate arid 
to multiply their ran}~s. A more realistic premise concerning 
the causes of the March Revolution may have given Kerensky 
(}: ..... 
reson to. end Russia Is participation in the \'/ar and to eli-
minatc absolutism without inviting anarch~. 
Kerensky was not alone in his interpretation of the 
revolution. 
''s€hbia~~bflthe~pe~iod1 6o~cffiudestthat the entitetnBnovisional 
Gov~rnmentl tried tol:tr.eat!:J the revolution_: as'l~ Palace i':-.r~ 
crevolution and ri.btlas& a •social! tUprd:.si:i:l.g<, demanding:;e; ;:iC ~ 
12 change. 11 One diplomat did conclude that those who ac-
J.l' 
cepted the theory that the revolution was merely a:move to. 
ensure a better, more organized fighting force_were "a lot of 
simpletons and are letting themselves .in for a bitter.disap-
pointment."13 ·A newspapei reporter, _Arno·Posch-Fleurot, 
writing in Fetrograd at the tim~ had possibly the most 
inrisive analysis of the situation. 
A national revolution against autocracy wa:·s 
being turned into a factional revolution . 
. agai!}St< :thee~ existent· ard er~·Of SOCiety~ \"and 
the success of the factional revolution was 
assUred by. the:ihsittende=offth~that~Qnally-
minded. rvrolutionists to go' on ofighting . 
the war,_:.·. 
Gover,nmt;nt- to:' ~emain -:incthe""! War .r: :.~~This:. U[lprec ed ent ed . war 
must be carried through:: to final victory. He who thinks of : 
peace at the pr~sent moment is a traitor to Russia." 15 
It is natural for people to associate leaders with the 
policies they advocate. Here a discredited leader advocates 
a certain policy. It would seem logical that the new leade~ 
would try to divorce himself from the fallen leader and his 
discredited policies. However, Kerensky tried to draw the. 
distinction between the Tsar and his policies. He later 
admitt~d that ~many Duma deputies did not realize how deep 
were the wrath and indignations of the masses in l~etrograd · 
against the chiefs and representatives of the old regime."16 
What Kerensky failed to grasp was that these fallen leaders 
had also tainted the policies they had implemented. The 
people were demanding change and Kerensky only offered them 
more of the same on the war issue. 
. ., 
I 
.As the Tsar fell from power, two centers of power emerged. 
The former Duma, which had been dissolved by the Tsar, .now met 
as a Committee of the Whole in the same building where they 
formerly, met as official Duma m~mbe~s. Also .emerging 
was a Soviet of . Workingmen' and Sold i.er~ Deputies. This soviet 
~ ,, ', 
' 
had first emerged at the instigation, of Trotsky during the 
1905 Revolution. · r:erensky was the· only person.(t~ serve in 
' ' 
both the Provisional G6vernment and the Soviei. He was soon 
' / ' ~ . .· 
appointed Minister of Justice in the inchoate frovisional 
" 
Government and also served as Vice-Chairman of the Eocecutive 
Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. A great debate ensued: 
among the socialist concerning Kerensky's role in the Fro-
visional Government. Kerensky decided he would se~ve in 
both organizations and did so over many objections among the 
members of the Soviet. Kerensky later admitted that. "from.· 
the first days of the Revolution my r.elations with the Sov.iet 
leaders were strained."l? 
Mass chaos pervaded· tfie.·atmosphere as no.·.one·.lsource of 
power could demonstrate any legitimacy_to rule. Russia had 
not experience~. such a void of leadership since the infamous 
Time of Troubles at the·beginning of the 17th century. Cne 
need only read Richard ~Pipe •'s; book Russia Lnd er the Cld 
' 
Regime to understand the affects a dissolution of the. monarchy 
would have on ~fhf~ patrimonial state. The ~rovisional 
Government desperately needed some source of recognition to 
demonstrate their legitimacy. t·.J ·:;J_,,. 
The Provisional Government sought their source of legiti-
macy fro;-:1 tr.e Allies. The Allies were glad to give this :.-::.· .. yc 
legitimacy, provided that the ~rovisiorial Government would 
take a strong stand in fav6r of a continued war effort. 
According to Kerensky the Provisional Government initial~ 
ly had no official opinion on the war and its aims. · "Cn 
this·question of the War and its aims the-~rovisional Govein-
ment was left absolutely freE, taking upon itself no formal 
. ., 
obligations, being at liberty to act as it wisi{E{d and pro-
,. 
claim whatever war aims it deemed proper and ~ecessary." 18 
The Allied ambassadors, however, im~ediateiy began to. pres-
sure the Provisional Government. I\iauric e Pabologue, ·.the 
French ambassador; played a key role in pressuring the Govern-
ment to pursue the war. Paleologue saw ~aul ~iliukov, 
Minister of Fo.reign l1ffairs, immediately after the abdication 
of the Tsar. He urged "very strongly that.the Provisional 
Government should delay no longer in solemnly proclaiming its 
loyalty to the alliance and its deterrnine:.tion tG continue. 
the war at anv cost. tt19' The supercilious ambassador re-
turned on March 18 to see r.liliukov. "Whatever reasons you 
may have for going slowly with the hotheads of the Soviet, 
you must realize that I cannot tolerate any doubt about your 
determination to continue the alliance and carry on the war.•• 20 
Miliukov published a statement of the~ Government's · 
position on r.:arch 20 which ... :~lie~_;·_ Y thought vwuld satisfy 
the demanding ambassador. He statE-::d tthattthe"first:.taskJ 
would~ be. i"to :carr.y..-: th~. waxt .1t.o .. ~.a. vd:c_td~ious. :conc_1usion" ~and 
prgntr:s~d: r 11 to .t'u:J_.fill r·lm~li~C.hi·!lgly -~if:he < ~g~eem_e.nts 1~0!1C:l.uded 
C :.:~·l~·.~··.::.,,, r.~ i-~·,· \·';"' -1·,, '1 v'·"'{.~--~·i.,,;": ·- J~._,J ... ,: .... ~J."' . , __ ; ........ I" .• ..• \ ...... _ • ..~.l- ........ ~ 
• . 'I 
(~' r,c} \,However," the1TFrench··~.a.moassad6r ~:wa:s Chat: fsat·:fsfied; 
In.rttiliukov's words he "carne running to me and pounced on 
me with indignation and bitter reproaches." He quotes 
Paleologue: "Germany is n6t mentioned at all: Not the 
slightest reference to our aims in the war: ..... 22 · Miliukov 
tried to placate the ambassador by promising future confir-
mations of the Russian. will to fight. 
The French ambassador was not alone in ~ressuring the 
young Government. After taiking to~~iliukov the.American . 
ambassador, David Francis, assured his government that ''the 
administration of the new Government was right-thinking, 
sincere, and.would prosecute the war fearl~ssly, regardless 
of its cost iri blood and treasure." Rodzianko (former 
Chairman of the Duma) and Miliukov both assure me that the 
. "3 Provisional Government will vigorously prosecute the war.~~ 
The English Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, r~ceived the 
follow.ing message soon after the March Revolution: "J, 11 
your influence should be thrown into the scale against any 
Administration which is not resolved to fight to a finish." 24 
Paleologue, again, symbolized the Allied position in 1917. 
When he was approached by an itinerant band of students· 
celebrating the Revolution he responded to their inquiries 
by saying "I cCJ.n render no better homage to Russian liberty 
t~an by asking you to join me in shouting 'Vive la Guerre.'"25 
The ambassador was obviously wrong. The demands of the 
political situation in Russia were in conflict with the 
demands of the Allied War effort. George Kennan refers to 
the Allied policy of only pursuing the war as "myopic" and 
further states that the American policy was based on "ig-
norance."26 He illustrates this conclusion by pointing to 
10 
the Allied Diplomatic conference held in Petrogratd,:i. ~efo;r_-~ythe 
Marc·h~Jl!'.:evolut"ib'n. The purposes .\Of this- conference were to 
stimulate the Russians td new war efforts and to'plan for a 
spring effensive. Kennan feels that the Allies'" missed a 
grand opportunity to witness first-hand the internal chaos 
that had made Russia's continued wa~ effort impossible. He· 
points to the post-conference statements of Dourmorg~e, the 
French Minister of Colonies, ~s evidence that the opportunity 
had been missed: ·"It is clear from all the conversations I 
had and all that I saw that Russia is filled with a unanimous 
will to pursue the war to a complete victory." 27 Cbviously 
he had been deceived by 6thers or by his own self-fulfilling 
wishes. Kennan criticizes this "myopia" and concludes that 
"to try to drive them to it G.tlie' war];"was :.tox::p.I)QV.i..d~yg.r,i~st 
. ')~ 
to the mill of the agitator and the fanatic.".::"' 
Y.erensky bec·ame (;by_ ;mid-snmm~r. th;E! W.moqt ~,±_nf:J__U\=l.nt:)..al:'~-II!~!J. r~n Russia. 
A western journalist wrote on !';larch 20 that "Kerensky is the 
idol of the people and everything he does makes him more 
popular. n29 ra leolocue also recognized :r:e~r·cnsky influence: 
"Kerensky is a man we must try to win over to our cause. 
He alone .is capable of making the Soviet realize the necessity 
of continuing the wa.r."3° Paleologue did indeed convince 
Kerensky of the benefic~nce of the Allied policy and Keren-
skv succeeded in convincing the Soviet that the war should be 
" 
continued until a general .. peace could be found. ·In doine so, 
however, Kerensky extinguished debate on the crucial question 
of the masses. Without a party in power which represented 
their basic longing for peace, the masses turned to the only 
party that promised immediate peace, the Bolsheviks. 
A western expert writing in 1926 expressed the opinion 
. . ' . 
that the "bourgeoisie had been completely deceived and had 
wildly over-estimated the enthusiasm of .the working class 
for the war."31 Another expert con~ludes that "out of touch 
with the real mood of the country, the liberal. leaders had 
assumed a patriotic devotion where none existed."3 2 This 
expert cites Ckhrana reports from as early as 1916 which 
concluded that many amo!'lg the masses believed that "the war 
cannotbe concluded successfully, and ought to be ended now."3) 
While Kerensky tried to restore the administrative apparatu~ 
of the state and fix the foundation of a new state and s6cial 
order; he also proclaimed that "one of the main duties was 
to carry on the 
?,I• 
war.""'"' ~nder these circumstances, with 
little support for the war among the lower classes, ~~erensky 
was pursui'ng:.! .. a policy doomed to fail. 
A western observer concluded at the time that "there 
is no question that in the first days of the Revolution the 
only cry that went up from Russia was a cry for peace. A 
passionate desire for peac(; was univc:rsa.l.";5 Yet this 
desire was not reflected in the Provisional Government. The 
Fetrograd Soviet even passed a resolution on April 13 favor-
ina a successful prosecution of the war. ~erhaps the efforts 
D 
of the Allies were affecting the policies of the ~rovisional 
Government which was still searching foi its legitimacy.to 
rul• . Ambassador Franc is .-ca:lil-ed Vinshington that: "It has 
b~en my effort ... to impress upon all the importance of-a 
vigorous prosecution of the war and: to subordinate ~h_er_et!o_, 
allquestions as to the rights of races or the recognition of· 
classes."J6 However, soon the beleaguered Sovi~.f would begin 
to hear the cries for peace and thus precipit~te the first 
crisis of the Provisional Government~ 
' 
To many the notion of a separate peace was considered 
shameful and ·incompatible with the honor and dignity of 
Russia~· This precipitated among some socialistE,theclu01ng 
i'""l ... _,_ 
the slogan "war or revolution," This policy was based onthe 
premise that either the rEvolution will kill the. war or the 
war will kill the revolution." 37 This lltlieoryt:: resulted in · 
a cry for a general peace based on the moral repudiation of 
the imperialist designs :of all governments through 2 united 
intern2tion2l proletariat: This Cth~o~yc spurred efforts by 
some Russians to organize an international peace conference 
at Stockholm. These efforts will be discuqscd later; the 
' 
immediate effect was intense pressure from the Soviet exerted 
on the frovisional Government to lead the way in announcing 
a policy of "peace without annexations or indemnities." 
A serious crisis developed as Kerensky and ~iliukov 
argued over the publication of Russia's war aims. ~iliukov 
published a statement of war ~ims consistent with the slogan 
"no idemnities, no annexations" 'on March 28. However, this 
statement was made only for domestic consumption. It did 
stimulate some dissent·among the membe~of ~he Soviet be-
cause of references to Russia's "observance fully (of) the 
obligations which have bee~: adopted with pespect ·to our ~llies > 38 
This was a reference to the now famous "secret :)treaties" 
which Russia had signed ~a~lier giving her control of the 
Dardflnelles and Constantinople after a successful completion 
. . ~ 
of the war. This opposition'smoldered for some time and was 
then revised by Kerensky in April. He began proclai~ing that 
only he among the me~bers of th~ Provisional Government 
supported fully the slogan "no · ind ernni ties, no annexations." 39 
' 
The Soviet soon began to demand that Miliukov send an address 
to the Allies proposing that· they renounce ~ali :·:u:a:imexati·ons.·S.nd 
indemnities." 
Miliukov finally agreed to send the Allies a note 
merely informing them of Russia's war aims. Miliukov, how-
ever, inserted a statement which read: 
Certain of the victorious conclusion of the 
war, united to our Allies, it is equally 
sure that the issue raised by this war will 
be settled in the sense of the realization 
of a secure and lasting peace, and that 
the advanced democracies inspired by the 
same desires, will find means to obtain the 
sanctions and guarantees necessary to 
avoid fHEther sanguinary conflicts in the 
future. } 
This statement obviously tried to obviate the purpose of 
the note: to renounce Russia's imperialistic treaties. 
A great debate ensued between Kerensky and Miliukov. The 
.lh' 
Allies played a key role in this debate. Faleologue firm~ 
ly supported Miliukov bu·t Buchanan sided with Kerensky. 
Also, the socialist delegation from France, headed by Albert 
Thomas, who would soon replace Paleologue, sided with Kerensky. 
Officially, Miliukov was supported: He proclaimed to Thomas: 
., 
"I was too victorious."4l Actually, however, the riftthad· 
. ' , ' "Jt' 
emboldened those who wished to form a· c oali tioq:l' government. 
This resulted in more socialists coming into the Government, 
Kerensky's rise to Minister of Kar, ~nd Miliukov's resigna-
tio~ the day before ~aleologue left for his returo to France. 
~iliukov had tried to w~lk a tight-rope between offending the 
Allies and offending the Soviet. He had failed. A new phase' 
of the revolution had begun but' still Russia had not extracted 
itself from that dreadful war. Tim~ was growing short. 
Before iPaleo~ogU:e.tcs: dep·ar:ture ~on'e ,bf: .:hi;s. :Hprimera:nd of 
jti'diCiious'' csources ,cdrtfe':ssed that: 
H6wever painful such ari admission must be to 
me, I feel I'm only doing my.duty in coming to 
tell you that the war cannot go on. ?eace 
must be made at the earliest possible mo-
ment ... Necessity is the law of ,history. , 
No one is c::J~.~~;clled to do the impossible. 42 
Paleologue responded: 
You mny be quite sure that ·the moment au~sia 
betrays her Allies, they will repudiate 
her ... Your Allies· also have the power of 
the purse which is 8bout to be doubled if 
not ~ripled by the help of the United States. 
We shall thus be in a position to continue 
the war for as long as is necessary. I 
must admit, howtver, that I have Eet %he 
same pessimism
4
on all sidE:s during the 
last few d8ys. '3 
Yet the tllies continued to push the Russians to fight. 
Pmerica appropriated $100 million in cfedits and ~15 million 
in cash to entice Russia to stay in the War. Francis still 
felt that the world situation. "demanded activities on my 
past to assist the Russian Government to keep the Russian 




r . · .. '-r'+ 
'r'# . • • • ' No doubt such a policy backe~ by hard cash would 
15 
have a significant impact on the Kerensky decision to remain 
in the War. 
The German High Command, in April, began· to follow a 
new tactic vis-a-vis Russia. A virtual armistic~ ensued ,. 
and the Germans began a dire6t appeal. to the Russian soldi~rs 
and people to end the war. Propaganda leaflets were circu-
lated which claimed Germany did not covet Russian land, but 
only wished to live in peace. This plan was aided by Bol-
shevik agitators who encouraged fraternizatiori between forces 
as a means to an immediate peace. These efforts were quite 
successful and were followed with diplomatic initiatives 
by Germany tu Russia. Kerensky reveals later that: "It 
was the plan of the German High Command that this armistice 
be followed by a separate peace ... Eer_lin's efforts to come 
to a direct agreement with Russia were begun as early as 
April."l~5 tinder heavy pressure at the time from the Allies, 
~erensky and the Government not only rebu~fed these German 
' 
appeals for a separate peace, but th~i began to accede to the 
long standing Allied demand that they begin an offensive. 
r:erensky reveals in his memoirs that "having reject0d the 
idea of a separate peace, which is always a misfortune for 
the country concluding it, the return to new action.became 
unavoidable ... 46 The Provisional Governme.nt was beginning 
to come to a concensus to begin an offensive and allay 
Allied concerns about their reticence to fight. The effects 
of this offensive would be catastrophic, for the struggling 
governmenffj.ould begin the slide to oblivion for Alexander 
Kerensky. 
Meanwhile, the general peace initiatives .iff the Siberian 
Zimmerwaldist were gaining· momentum. ' This po.licy of "just 
d efensism" 'Nhile worldng for peace vLas quite popular among 
the more moderate socialists of the Revolution. A Soviet 
delegation left in June to travel around Europe and to 
stimulate interest in the"'Stockholm Pe.ace Conference. This 
group at first met with limited acceptance of their appeal, 
especially in France. Eventually they convinced the Italian 
Socialists to favor.the Conference. They then received the 
'greatest possible boost to their'efforts. Sir Arthur 
Henderson, a socialist member of the British cabinet, convinced 
. . 
the British Labour Party to support this conference.47 
The Allied governments had at first tre~ted these delegates 
as itinerant dreamers of no consequence. The support of the 
British Labour ?arty, however, signalled that there might be 
some chance for ~he socialists to bring th~is peace conference· 
to fruition. The Allies immediately colluded to squash this 
peace movement. The day after the British Labour Party vote, 
the British Government voted· :to- rescind the passports of all 
those who wished to attend this conference. The effects were 
. t t f 1+8 fatal to th1s nAscen movemen or peace. 
1 
.l f 
·The. effects of this decision also had a tremendous 
impact on domestic. Russian politics. Ambassador Buchanan told 
his government that "Kerensky begged me this morning to urge 
His Majesty's Government not to refuse passports to our 
.Socialists. "49 The failure of this mission under£!.-u:t 'the 
position of the moderate socialists in Russia.· Having arrived 
in western Europe with great hopes, they return.,e'd bitterly 
.1! 
disappointed. Rex Wade, 'a western s6holar, c6ncludes that the: 
moderate socialists (had) made ... ~negotiated 
peace through Stockholm the·cornerstone of 
their foreign policy program and (had) sent 
the delegation abroad to further this cause. 
Their empty-handed return contributed to 
and symbolized the failure of.the-moderates 
in 1917. 
The admission that the Stockholm Conference would not meet 
in the near future was also an admission.that t~e.pe~ce' 
program of Soviet majority, ·tied as it was to a ·ge~-ieral peace 
via the conference, was collapsing, leaving them without any 
meaningful program in this ~ital area.5° In another aiticle, 
; 
Wade goes so far as to conclude that the failure .of this 
mission "was one of the main causes of the failure of the 
moderate~ . socialists and of the victory. of the :Solsheviks. "51 
The Allies cannot escape blame for this failure as they 
continued their "myopic" interpretation of events without 
regard for the domestic repe~cussions in Russia. 
In Russia, rneanwhil~, a new military strategy was 
evolving. Kerencky later admitted that ''it was quite futile 
~? 
to think of victory. . . in the sum~ner of 1917. II _.I·· Kerensky' 
exp1atne,ct,s.:b,owejrer:, that a new stra'teg'y :was ~appropriate.·~· 
But a victory was not necessary! Ar.President 
Wilson declared categorically before Con~ 
gress, it was the Russian Revolution which 
made it possible for America to enter the 
War and thus alter fundamentally the ratio 
of the contending forces in the War .•. In. 
the summer of 1917 it became necessary · 
only to keep going until the arrival of the 
American army on the Western Front, with all 
its tremendous resources. This general 
Allied task exposed itself, so far as 
Russia was concerned, in a ne~ strategic 
aim: we were no longer required to engag~ 
in a general offensive, but to compel the: 
Germans to keep as many divisions as p9s's5~ble on the Russian Front until.the autumn ..•. ~ 
Cbvi6usly, the Allies, the U~S. spedifically, played a sig-
nificant role in Kerensky's decision to stay in the war. 
Rex Wade, again, conclude3 that because of the policies cif 
the Allies the Russians "were gradually forced into a posi-
tion of simply trying to hold on while the war took its 
~lj.. course."-' Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks continued to agitate 
among the lower classes. 
of 
The stt'ategy1 holding on perversely resulted in the 
decision to initiate an offensive against the Germans. 
The interpretations of the reasons for this offensive are 
many. Howeve:r, mostoCof- those·':interpretc:iti'ohs "indicate that 
there :·\~as ':a' sigi-rii·ficant 'roie tpl~tyed ]hyo fhe 'Ailfefs' to tericourage this 
action. Edmund Walsh writes that Kerensky was, in part 
"respondine; to the Allies Vlhen he ordered an 
attack."55 An observer felt at the time that Kerensky was 
convinced that "the war rr.ust be waged at 
Tsereteli, the l~ader of the Zimmerwald movement, cited 
nebulous "external factors" and supported the offensive.57 
George Kennan concludes that the offensive was an effort to 
1.9 
"impress the Allies."58 Another expert speaking at the annual 
meeting of the American Historical Association in 1968 
said that the effort was a "final and futile sacrifice for 
the .Allies." 59 This speaker also ·:pdsilts that 1--.erensky 
h6ped to. eain leverage through a successful offensive which 
he could use to bargain with·the Allies for ievised wa~.aims.GO 
/ l. 
Perhaps of crucial importance to this decision was the 
visit of the Root Mission to Russia in June of 1917. This 
group, representing l~resident Hilson"~ was headed by Elihu 
Root, a distinguished American but hardly an expert in Russian 
affairs or for that matter particularly_interested in Russian 
affairs. In ::;hart, the goal of this mission was "to-drive 
home the thought that the degree of American support for the_ 
Provisional Government would depend strictly on the vigor of 
61 Russia's war effort." :... Anoautb.or;twritingc a.t~i thettithe~ :,concluded 
that5. the ttbb:vi~us,_:.inissi0n\'-of R0ot"' was:~to~'zba.ke~- :Russi~? fight. rr62 
Walsh concluded that ''extraordinary pressure was brought to 
bear on Kerensky by the Allies, who urged him to give a 
practical proof of Russia's solidarity with the war aims 
of the Entente.•· 63 In short, Root conveyed the message 
to Kerensky ":\o fight, no loan ... 6L~ 
Kerensky later stated that his main task as Minister 
of \'lar was "to restore by all means at hand the fighting 
capacity of the army. To accomplish this I was to move the 
army to an offensive ... which would bring about a sharp change 
in the attitude and sentiment of the arrny ... c5 Kerensky 
also felt that there was a need to "wipe out the shame."66 
----~----
20, 
Who else would ~li·ci:td this shame except the Allies? 
Finally, Kerensky felt that only the Socialists could inspire 
the war-weary army to fight. 
He proved to· be utterly wrong. Although the Russian 
army ·met with success in the first 'few days of battle, it 
was soon forced to retreat haphazardly. The long await~d 
offensive, which the Allies had p~shed so hard _..i'~r, was a 
,. 
fiasco within days of its beginning. In the wake of this 
catastrophe Kerensky was appointed premeir as ?rince Lvov 
. . . 
resigned. Kerensky tried to.emphasize that everyone. had 
supported this offensive. On this point he is almost correct. 
This failed offensive had now tainted all the socialist 
moderates in office with the·policy of a continued war. Only 
the Bolsheviks had opposed the offensive. The Government 
continued to alienate the lower classes and force them to 
the open arms of the Bolsheviks. 
In the aftermath of this fiasco, 1Cerensky appointed 
L. Kornilov, over the objections of many, as suprem~ military 
commander. Kerensky viewed Kornilov as one who could help 
restore order to a quickly disintegrating society. In truth, 
he had precipitated a chain of events which would lead to 
his dovm:fc.ll. 
Kerensky immediately scheduled a Moscow State Conference 
of representatives of all facets of Russian societ~which 
he hoped would result in a new unified comrni tment among all 
of Russia's disparate power groups. The Conference failed 
and only "ill'...~minated 'the disunity of the nation ... [? 
21 
Soon after i(erensky appointed Kornilov he began to view 
him as a rival for power; ,_-:~·Indeed, Kornilov was a dynamic 
figure around whom the conservative forces of the nation ( 
' 
could rally. Ambassador Francis found Kornilov's appointment 
"reassuring. "68 The;·Dut.chc" ambassad·o.r"'.C!;·:i~~t considered 1\or-. 
nilov a. "personal friend," and he was pleased with his 
appointment.69 
In preparation for the Moscow Conference' J:ornilov pro-
posed several repressive measures which.hewished. to announce 
' ~ 
at the Conference. Cn Aufust 23 Kornilov visited Kerensky to 
try to persuade him to approve these measures. The fact that 
Kornilov brought his own guard to this cieeting only added to 
the tension pervading th~ cionfrontation. Kerensky, however, 
still refused to accept these measure.. Therefore, the 
Provisional Government entered the Conference with no "definite 
program" and only promises for more of the same. 70 !~ornilov is report 
;.td.<h:avEr 2'said:.;.; i.•(I_ ~oriJ.y <..wi.sh ~to, :.Sav.e ~Ru'ssi;a;~ ari'd•i.\v'i·l1-' tglad'J.y submit 
. 
to a strong l'rovisional Government, purified of all undesirable· 
elements."71 Eerens~y began to fear that Kornilov would 
"gobble up" the Government.72 In the wake of the conference 
to unify the nation "rumors about possible coups d'etat were 
rampant~"7J 1\round Kerensky there grew. a "terrifying v-acuum." 74 
. . ~ 
His days as the central figure in .the Russian drama·wer.e 
coming to ~.close, as his country polarized and he sat 
paralyzed, fearing above all the outbreak of civil war. 
After the Conferenc~more and more conservatives LeGan 
to beseech Kornilo~ to restore order. :onspiracies were 
?') 
(.,c ... 
plenty. Kerensky later blames the Allies for urging Kornilov 
to usurp power.75 There does seem to be evidence that the 
British embassy printed and distributed posters which pro-
claimed Kornilov as'a national hero.76 Kerensky even charges 
Lord Milner, British War Minister, with sending a letter to 
Koznilov urging a coup.?? It would not be illogical, given the 
previous actions and positions of .the Allies, :ti conclude 
that they were at least amenable to ~rKotnilov coup. How-
ever, before Kornilov could initiat~thi~ coup a man whom 
later investigators would hold ... responsible for the tragic 
•course~·ofevents" entered the picture and precipitated this 
crisis.78 
This man, V.H. Lvov, former Procurator of the Holy 
Synod, saw Kerensky on September 4, Kerensky deni~s authorizing 
him.to speak to anyone on his behalf. However, Lvov .left 
. . 
Kerensky and traveled to military headquarteri to see Kornilov. 
Lvov implied that he had been sent by Kerensl{y to present 
Kornilov with three options for a future govern~ent. Kornilov, 
believing ~erensky was abdicating his power, indi~ated l1e · 
would prefer the third option which would have made Kornilov 
the sole dictator of Russia. 
Lvov returned to l~erensky and said that J·~ornilov v1anted 
to be the supreme dictator of Russia. Kerensky anonymously 
confirmed this by telegraph with L.ornilov. l:ornilov thought 
Kerensky was only confirming the offer made by Lvov and readily 
admitted that he was prepared to take power. Kerensky ar-
rested Lvov and fired r-:ornilov. The Central Executive Com-
mittee of the All-Russian Soviet declared Koinilov a:traitor 
and called on the army to resist his .. order. 
Kornilov ·is:- saird:.tto have responded: 
Russians, our great fatherland lies dying, 
its hour of death is near. rorced to 
act publicly, I, General Kornilov, ~declare 
that the Provisional Government~ under 
pressure of the Bolshevik majority of 
the Soviet, acts in complete harmony 
with the plans of the German General 
Staff ... I swear to lead the people :· 
on the path of victory over the enemy ... Bo 
With those words Kornilov ordered his protege, General 
Krymov, to march on ?etrograd. 
A letter written by Kerensky's personal secretary to 
his wife in London as Krymov approaches Petrograd may·serve 
as an indicator of Kerensky's thoughts during this crucial 
time. 
Kornilov the other night openly raised the 
_banner of rebellion. His regiments are 
marching on 2etrograd •.• A .battle is 
immenent. It is impossible to foresee 
the issue of the battle. If I~ornilov 
wins- which is likely- our fate will be 
settled, while a state of anarchy will ~ 
be inaugurated throughout Russia. If 
our troops win thinr,s may be better, 
but even then the general situation will 
be worse than ever, as it is certain that 
famine, riots, ect. are inevitable. As 
you see I am in the mess:·and I am un-
able to get out. of i31 .. Altogether the situation is gloomy. 
This document facilitates an understanding of why Kerensky 
turned to anyone who would help him oppose Kornilov. 
Lenin leaped at the opportunity • Accor"dln.g-::to 1 KeY.ensky, who 
ltfayu be.· suspected;_: as~ ·biased'.:. Len1.-n'·rsaid·:: 11 Geiier§.l K·ornilbv has opened 
n~ 8 
7.fOr UB qud.te" tine:X"p'ectedvpersp~cti'l/est ~-.1 We:.: must:~. act at bhce't fl 2 
The Soviets · immediately organized to defeat 
this counter-ievolution. General Krymov's troops melted 
away into the arms of Bolshevik agitators before he even 
reached Petrograd. Voicing the predominant view, one scholar 
concludes that "it was due to the efforts of the Soviets, 
not of the government, that the rebellion was squashed.•• 8J 
Kerensky a~d the~mod~rates were undermined by this 
attempt at counter-revolution: "Fear of counteP-revolution · 
had c:produced a decisive shift to the left among the working 
classes." 84 In addition, Kere~sky had been forced to distri-
bute arms and ammunition among the Bolsheviks. It was as if he 
thad ·been:~ fo:rce& -to entr.u'st::.hi's:: defense to a boa constrictor. 
Cne expert best states the effect of this affair. "The 
Kornilov rebellion was essentially a test of strength be-
tween Kornilov and Kerensky; the victor ... was Lenin.u 85 
From this point forward Kerensky's fate was sealed.· Cne 
diplomat felt that the "population became convinced that the 
Bolsheviks were going to have it all their ovm way. "86 Si:x 
days after Kornilov's defeat the Bolsheviks took control 
of the Soviet and proposed to use the same army that had risen 
against Kornilov in a new surge for power against Kerensky. 
It is difficult to conclude what specific tasks the 
Allies undertook to embolden J:ornilov to mnke his move for 
power. However, there is so~e evidence thit at least the 
British were involved in some sort of encouragement of 
Kornilov and other conservative el.ements who wished to 
restore order. At the least, one may conclude that the 
Allies did not discourage this move and in fact rnay have been 
conspicuously quiet on the matter. ..Co~cerned :.onJ.ry with the 
war effort, the Allies ·were seeking all means to insure a 
stable pro-war. government .in Russia. The result was the 
antithesis of their desires. 
November 7 quickly approached~ · .A Russian general d.s:;reported by 
Chernovt'tn-t:h'ave·~·c·cYn.clud'(~'Ci thatt.T•Kerensl;:y.~'and:·ll:is·-:grOl.ip are not at 
presentc1 up'"1td~::the demand.st,ot:.tne situation.-~: The mas·s~s are turning to 
the Left, while the intelligenttia are turnirig Right ... 
Kerensky stands still and beneath him an abyss is forrning." 87 . 
Very_ soon the bolsheviks made their move to obtain power. 
They were met with little resistance. Kerensky had depended 
on the su~port of the Coss~cks; but the Cossacks had seen 
their hero, l:ornilov, betrayed by Kerensky and they, therefore, 
decided to do nothing to defend Kerensky .. Kerensky C?ntinued 
to call for their help and they continued to say "yes, yes, 
. . 88 
we're coming, as soon as we saddle our horses."" They 
never came and Kerensky was forced to flee. The Bolsheviks· 
had come to power and they were determined to restore order 
to the society, that is a Bolshevik order of co~munism. 
Allied policy in Russia hud resulted in Abject failure. 
secrE:tary writing in :::.nt;land i'n mid- · 
December of 1917 indicated that o~of the main reasons for 
~ 
Eerensl\:y' s fall from power was the A lli;;s' "neglect of the 
public opinion of the Rues ian d £or::ocracy upcn which !(ercnsky' s 
89 administration was based.'' The ~Dnchester Guardian was 
one of the few Western newspapers to indict Allied policy in 
the afterm<Jth of Kerensky' s failure. Cn :'iovcmber 10 they 
edi tcrialized that' ... Allied support could have removed .. 
Russia from the war pc:acefully" and avoided the rise to power 
of Bolshevism.9° Kerensky, himself, later admits that he 
Jmew "the soldiers were not quite sure whether it was neces• 
sary to die when there, in the rear; the fond dreams of 
e;enerations were being realized."9l -Yet he continued to 
accede to Allied pres sur~~ by launching the July'offcnsi ve, 
Kerensky also makes the final indictment of his own and 
.Allied policy by concludinG that "t~e trump card of the 
Bolsheviki was peace, peace, immediate peace!"9 2 
This paper has not sought to detail Kerensky's life, nor 
has it sought to detail the policies of the }rovisional 
Government; it has sought to detail the effect of the Allied 
policy of insisting on a continued war effort by Russia and 
to link this Allied policy with the causes for the rise of 
Bolshevism. It is not contended that this Allied policy 
was the s·ole cause of Kerensky' s fall from power. ::erE:nsky 
may have harbored ambitions of attaininG the dream of all 
previous Russian leaders, the acquisition of Constantinople. 
In acceding to the Allies' demand that he not withdraw from 
the war, he probably weighed all of the possible monetary 
gains he could accrue if he only "held on:• in the war against 
the likelihood of the Bolsheviks' rising to power. Ee 
decided to place his bet on the continued war effort and he 
lost. There can be little doubt that the Allies had a sig-
nificant effect on this dcci~ion and they therefore must 
be held accountable as well. The Allies lost their bet as 
much as Kerensky lost his. Current policy-makers sh6uld 
r • 
~. 
learn from this experience that myopic policy without 
regard to the domestic repercussioni in other countries can 
quite easily lead to disaster in the long term interests 
of both countries. 
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